Wage Compression and Welfare in Sweden*

Matthew J. Lindquist†

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Abstract

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare effects of union wage compression in Sweden. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low skilled workers. These losses can be significantly reduced (but not eliminated) if firms and unions bargain over efficient labor contracts. In both cases, the effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.

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†Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm. mj@ne.su.se.
1 Introduction

Sweden is well known for its relative wage equality. Wage differentials decreased substantially in Sweden during the 1960's and 1970's and the current wage dispersion is low by international standards (Davis, 1992; Freeman and Katz, 1995). One important example of this trend towards lower wage differentials can be seen in the changing university wage premium.\(^1\) In Table 1, we see that the wage premium for university graduates fell during the 1970's in both the United States and in Sweden. We also see that while the university wage premium in the United States made a dramatic recovery during the 1980's, the Swedish university wage premium has remained relatively low compared to its previous level and compared with the wage premium in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<tr>
<td>1969 = 1.49</td>
<td>1968 = 1.40</td>
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<td>1978 = 1.35</td>
<td>1981 = 1.16</td>
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<td>1987 = 1.52</td>
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<td>1992 = 1.60(^b)</td>
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\(^a\) Source: Davis (1992).

\(^b\) Figure from 1987 extended with index from Krusell et al. (2000).

\(^c\) Source: Hansen (1997).

The fact that the Swedish wage premium is lower than the wage premium in the United States is not, in and of itself, surprising. Wage differentials along all dimensions (age, gender, etc.) are lower in Sweden than in the United States (Davis, 1992; Freeman and Katz, 1995). What makes this fact interesting is that the two wage premia were so similar in the late 1960's and that the decline in the Swedish wage premium was so large in comparison and its recovery so small: despite the fact

\(^1\) The University wage premium is defined as the ratio of average, full-time earnings of a worker with 16 years of education to the average, full-time earnings of a worker who has 12 years of education.
that the supply of university educated labor grew by roughly the same amount in both countries during this period.\footnote{Krussell et al. (2000) calculate an index for the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor inputs in the United States which grew by 240 percent between 1963 and 1992. Edin and Holmlund (1995) report that the percentage of the Swedish work force with a university education rose from about 5.4 to 12 percent between 1971 and 1991. This is an increase of 222 percent.} Furthermore, the dramatic decline in the Swedish wage premium occurred between 1968 and 1974, with only minor changes in the wage premium afterwards (Arai and Kjellström, 1999). We do not, however, observe an extraordinary increase in the number of university educated workers during this period (Arai and Kjellström, 1999). Together, these simple observations imply that, perhaps, the Swedish wage premium is not being moved by market forces alone.

Most authors have attributed this precipitous reduction in wage inequality to a combination of two factors; to an increase in the supply of university graduates (Edin and Holmlund, 1995) and to the egalitarian wage policies of the Swedish trade unions.\footnote{See, for example, Flam, 1987; Flanagan, 1987; Agell and Lommerud, 1993; Henrekson et al., 1996; Lindbeck et al., 1993; Aronsson and Walker, 1997; Edin and Topel, 1997; Arai and Kjellström, 1999.} The original goal of the trade unions' wage policy was to establish equal pay for equal work (regardless of workplace), but difficulties in operationalizing this goal, together with an increased radicalism in the Swedish labor movement during the late 1960's and early 1970's, led to a revision of this goal towards a more egalitarian policy of equal pay for all work (Lindquist, 1991). This change in union policy coincides with the severe drop in the university wage premium between 1968 and 1974.

The main presumption in this paper is that the Swedish trade unions have, in fact, been successful in promoting wage equality across workers with different educational backgrounds and, hence, different marginal products. Given this presumption, the purpose of this study is to quantify the welfare effects of this distortionary wage policy. Specifically, this paper will address the welfare costs of Sweden's low university wage premium.

There are at least four distortionary effects associated with wage compression which may be harmful to welfare. First, the choice of hours worked by skilled and
unskilled labor is distorted (Aronsson and Walker, 1997). Low skilled workers work too much, while high skilled workers work too little. The number of skilled workers in the economy may also be too low, since the low skill premium may reduce incentives for unskilled workers to acquire the necessary education needed to become skilled (Lindbeck et al., 1993; Henrekson et al., 1996; Edin and Topel, 1997; Aronsson and Walker, 1997). Both of these effects may lead to losses in aggregate output and consumption and, hence, lower welfare. Furthermore, if technological change is skill-biased or if there are significant, positive externalities associated with education, then, too few skilled workers in the economy working to few hours, may lead to a lower rate of productivity growth (Lindbeck et al., 1993; Henrekson et al., 1996). Wage compression may also be detrimental to the creation and maintenance of employment opportunities for youths and for low skilled adults (Flanagan, 1987; Flam, 1987; Nickell and Layard, 1999).

The most common arguments in favor of egalitarian wage policies are those associated with the hypotheses of fair- and/or efficiency-wages (e.g. Agell and Lundborg, 1992, 1995) and also with the classic Rhen-Meidner model which argues that wage compression (together with an active labor market policy) promotes growth oriented structural changes by inducing labor and capital to move to more productive sectors of the economy.\footnote{For a more modern, endogenous growth version of this classic argument see Agell and Lommerud (1993).} But, however convincing these hypotheses may be when dealing with intra-job (horizontal)\footnote{The terms "intra-job" and "horizontal" wage compression used here, are synonymous with the term "within group inequality" used elsewhere.} wage compression, they are probably less applicable to inter-job (vertical)\footnote{The terms "inter-job" and "vertical" wage compression used here, are synonymous with the term "between group inequality" used elsewhere.} wage compression.\footnote{First of all, the Rhen-Meidner model calls for horizontal wage compression in order to induce productivity increasing structural change, not vertical wage compression. Secondly, in regards to the fair wage hypothesis, we must consider the possibility that many workers may feel that wage differentials which reflect higher education (productivity) or greater work effort are, in fact, fair.}

Arguments in favor of wage compression are often times framed in second-best
settings, in which wage compression has the potential to offset the existing negative effects of some externality or missing market. For example, Bertola (1999) argues that in a search model with firing costs a compressed wage distribution may, in fact, increase welfare by raising the desired amount of hiring and firing back towards the first-best solution. Agell and Lommerud (1992) argue that the insurance benefits from small amounts of wage compression may increase welfare. Others argue that wage compression may, in fact, increase incentives for skill formation (Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Agell and Lommerud, 1997) or give employers incentives to provide more on the job training for their workers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).8

The public debate on wage formation in Sweden is often dominated by these types of welfare arguments. But, while the qualitative side of this literature is well developed, there have been no systematic attempts at examining the quantitative significance of the welfare effects of wage compression and of Sweden’s low university wage premium.9 This study will address these effects explicitly and attempt to quantify their significance and, hence, relevance to the debate.

This paper focuses upon the welfare costs of distortions to the supply of labor in terms of the number of skilled workers active in the economy and to the demand for labor in terms of employment opportunities for low skilled workers. This paper does not address choice of hours nor does it address positive growth externalities which many associate with investments in education. The exclusion of these two factors means that the quantitative results arrived at in this study will most likely suffer from a downward bias.

The model developed in this paper is a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). In Sections 2 through 5, the effects of wage compression are

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8 For a more thorough discussion of these topics, as well as an analysis of their implications for public policy see Agell (1999).

9 Aronsson and Walker’s (1997) paper does, in fact, calculate changes in the budget sets actually faced by different types of workers due to changes in welfare state policies. They do not, however, use this information to make quantitative statements about individual behavior or welfare.
analyzed in a competitive market setting. In Section 6, the labor market is modeled as a Nash bargaining game where unions and firms bargain in order to achieve more efficient labor contracts. In both types of labor markets, the initial steady state of the economy is marked by wage compression which is introduced by a union that has the power to determine relative wages. In both cases, wage compression leads to an increase in unemployment among low skilled workers and a decrease in the number of high skilled workers in the economy.

The model with competitive markets is introduced in Section 2. The model is calibrated using empirical observations from the Swedish economy in 1993. In Section 3, wage compression is removed and the subsequent economy (including the transition) is simulated. The results of this simulation show that compressing wages in the model by 5 percent creates 5.5 percent unemployment among low skilled workers and decreases the number of skilled workers in the work force by 0.28 percent. The aggregate efficiency loss (in terms of foregone consumption) is equal to 4.63 percent of aggregate consumption.

The impact of wage compression on the number of skilled workers active in the model is surprisingly small. The negative effect that wage compression has upon the percentage of skilled workers in the work force is mitigated, in part, by the increase in unemployment among low skilled workers that it creates, since higher unemployment among low skilled workers lowers the opportunity cost of attending university.\footnote{This mechanism is quite similar to those discussed in Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Agell and Lommerud (1997).} So, the incentives to choose schooling faced by an individual after wage compression is introduced into the economy change by less than the change in the wage premium. In fact, the progressive tax system appears to have a larger (negative) impact than wage compression on the supply of skilled labor.

The welfare gains obtained by individual workers from removing wage compression from the economy are calculated in Section 4. These welfare calculations show that
removing wage compression from the economy results in large welfare gains for all types of workers. These gains range from between 2 percent to as much as 21 percent, depending on an agent’s type and on their age at the time of the policy change.

The extent to which these large welfare gains can actually be realized, however, depends, to a large degree, on how effectively increases in the government’s budget surplus (due to lower expenditures on unemployment insurance and to a larger tax base) are translated into consumption and utility. If increases in the government’s budget surplus lead to increases in the quantity and quality of government services, to larger transfers, or to lower taxes, then all workers are better off in the economy without wage compression. That is, even unskilled workers are hurt by the very policy intended to help them.

On the other hand, if the unemployment insurance system is inefficient, or if government services are not fully productive, unskilled workers with employment are better off in the economy with wage compression. If this is the case, and if the union represents the interests of a simple majority of its members, then the union has no reason to abandon its distortionary wage policy, despite the welfare cost it imposes on society. These costs are born by skilled workers and by the unemployed. It is the unemployed, however, who carry the biggest burden.

If markets are not competitive, and are instead characterized by bargaining between unions and firms, then unions may have an important channel through which they can mitigate the negative employment (and, hence, welfare) effects of wage compression. This point is demonstrated in Section 6 by formalizing an efficient labor contract as the solution to a Nash bargaining game.

The introduction of wage compression into the Nash bargaining model has the same qualitative effects as it did in the model with competitive markets. The cost of wage compression, however, is much lower in the Nash bargaining model, since bargaining over both wages and employment produces an efficient labor contract

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11A similar argument can be found in Nickell and Layard (1999).
which lowers the negative employment effects of wage compression. The aggregate efficiency gain obtained by removing wage compression from the Nash bargaining model is equal to 0.60 percent of aggregate consumption. Individual welfare gains range from between −0.15 percent and 17.78 percent. In fact, a majority of workers are slightly better off in the economy with wage compression, while a minority are much worse off.

2 The Model

Consider an economy populated by a number of finitely lived agents who live $J$ years and who differ in skills, ability and employment status. Skilled workers, $s_t$, are those who have chosen to undertake a formal education which raises their productivity level. Unskilled workers, $u_t$, are those who have chosen not to educate themselves. Unemployed agents, $un_t$, have neither an education nor a job. The population is normalized, so that $\sum_{j=1}^{J} s_{j,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} u_{j,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} un_{j,t} = 1$. Henceforth, agent type will be denoted as $i$, where $i \in \{u, s, un\}$.

Each individual is indexed by a variable $\lambda \in (-\infty, \infty)$, which represents his or her taste and aptitude for schooling, where $\lambda$ is distributed over the population in line with the cumulative distribution function $\Lambda(\lambda)$. As we shall see below, an individual's $\lambda$ will affect his or her choice of schooling. Individuals with a higher taste and aptitude for schooling will be more likely to choose schooling and become skilled workers.

Agents enter the economy as adults. They work for 45 years. They are retired for 15 years and die at $J = 60$.

Agents choose schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital) in order to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor which he or she supplies to the market in an inelastic manner. The problem of
a type $i$ agent born in period $t$ is given by

$$
\max_{a_{i,j,t}, a_{i,j+1,t}} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta^{j-1} \log \left(c_{i,j,t}\right)
$$

subject to the boundary constraints for asset holdings

$$
a_{i,1,t}, a_{i,j+1,t} = 0
$$

and to the agent’s budget constraint

$$
c_{i,j,t} = a_{i,j,t}(1 + r_{t+j-1}(1 - \tau_i)) + u_{i,t+j-1}(1 - \tau_i) - a_{i,j+1,t} + tr_{t+j-1}
$$

Agents have log utility functions and $\beta$ is the subjective discount factor. The choice variables are $c_{i,j,t}$ (current consumption) and $a_{i,j+1,t}$ (current savings, i.e., assets carried into the next period). The government taxes wage income by $\tau_i$ and capital income by $\tau_k$. The government also transfers $tr_{t+j-1}$ to each agent in each period.

In the first period of his or her life each agent must choose, once and for all, whether or not to invest the necessary time, effort and resources into obtaining a university education. The choice of schooling is viewed here as an investment decision made by comparing the expected lifetime utility associated with the individual’s two alternatives.

An education takes 3 years to complete. The direct cost of schooling (tuition fees, books, etc.) is assumed to be zero. But, each individual does face a unique utility cost, $\Omega(\lambda)^{-\omega}$, which is negatively related to his or her taste and aptitude for schooling, $\lambda$. Thus, high $\lambda$ individuals will have a lower individual utility cost of acquiring an education and are, therefore, more likely to choose schooling and become skilled workers. Schooling also entails an opportunity cost in terms of lost wages while in school. The government does, however, supply financial aid to students.

In equilibrium, the share of skilled workers in the economy, $s_t$, will be equal to
the fraction of the population whose expected lifetime utility of becoming a skilled worker, $V_s,t$, less their individual utility cost, is greater than or equal to their expected lifetime utility of remaining unskilled, $V_u,t$. In terms of the model equilibrium, $s_t$ will be given by\textsuperscript{12}

$$s_t = 1 - \Lambda (\lambda^*)$$

(4)

where $\lambda$ is assumed to be standard normally distributed and where $\lambda^*$ solves

$$V_{s,t} - \Omega (\lambda^*)^{-\omega} = V_{u,t}.$$  

(5)

After the choice of schooling is made, unskilled workers face a one-shot employment lottery. Agents who become unemployed receive unemployment benefits from the government.

Individuals do not have to pay for education. It is provided by the government free of charge in a perfectly elastic manner. The government produces education, $e_t$, with a constant returns to scale technology

$$e_t = \Phi students_t$$

(6)

where $\Phi$ is the per unit cost of providing education and $students_t$ is the number of people enrolled in higher education at time $t$. The government also supplies financial aid to students in the form of a taxable wage, $aid_t = dw_{u,t}$, where $d$ is a foregone wage replacement ratio. The government's total net expenditure on education, $E_t$, is

$$E_t = (\Phi + (1 - \tau_s) aid_t) students_t.$$  

(7)

As mentioned above, the government also maintains an unemployment insurance program for unskilled workers who do not have jobs. These agents, $un_t$, receive

\textsuperscript{12}The formulation of this problem is similar to that used by Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997).
unemployment benefits in the form of a taxable wage, $bw_u$, where $b$ is the wage replacement ratio. The government also provides services in the form of an equal lump sum transfer to each individual, $tr_l$.

To finance its expenditures the government taxes both capital and wage income. It applies a proportional tax on capital income, $\tau_k$, and a pair of proportional taxes on wage income, $\tau_s$ and $\tau_u$. The government implements a progressive marginal tax system by setting $\tau_s > \tau_u$.

The government is required to maintain a balanced budget in each period, so that

$$tr_l = \tau_s w_s t n_s t + \tau_u w_u t n_u t + \tau r p k - (1 - \tau_u) bw_u t n_u t - E_t. \quad (8)$$

As such, transfers are merely the residual from government income less government expenditures and can be either positive or negative (depending on the parameters of the model). In the cases presented in this paper, transfers are always positive.

On the production side of the economy, there is a continuum of firms which have identical, three-factor, Cobb-Douglas production functions. Firms use capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor supplied by the agents to produce output and they behave competitively in product and factor markets. There is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy.

Assuming constant returns to scale allows us to aggregate across firms without loss of generality, so that aggregate production can be written as

$$y_t = f(k_t, n_s t, n_u t) = k_t^{\theta_k} n_s t^{\theta_s} n_u t^{\theta_u} \quad (9)$$

where $\theta_k + \theta_s + \theta_u = 1$. The variables $y_t, k_t, n_s t$ and $n_u t$ are output, capital, skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Aggregate production is subject to the distribution of skills in the working age population where $R$ denotes the retirement age

$$n_s t \leq \sum_{j=4}^{R-1} s_{j, t} \quad (10)$$
\[ n_{u,t} \leq \frac{R - 1}{J} - \sum_{j=1}^{R-1} s_{j,t}. \]  

The law of motion for the aggregate capital stock is

\[ k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) k_t + x_t. \]  

Capital depreciates at a constant rate \( \delta \) and investment is given by \( x_t \).

2.1 Wage Compression

Imagine that the initial steady state of this economy is marked by wage compression which artificially lowers the wage premium for skilled workers. Wage compression is introduced by a union that has the power to determine relative wages. Labor contracts are of the right-to-manage type\(^\text{13}\) which allows the union to implement a more compressed wage structure by raising the low skilled wage above its perfect market value. At this higher wage, competitive firms will employ fewer low skilled workers. Thus, in the initial steady state with wage compression, there will be some unemployment among low skilled workers.

The market for skilled labor, on the other hand, is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Thus, there will be no unemployment among skilled workers. The introduction of wage compression does, however, lower the wage of skilled labor below its perfect market level.\(^\text{14}\) This leads to fewer individuals choosing education and, hence, fewer skilled workers active in the economy.

\(^{13}\)A right-to-manage labor contract is one in which the firm and union bargain over wages. Then, after wages are determined, the firm determines employment unilaterally by hiring workers up to the point were their wages are equal to their marginal products (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1993).

\(^{14}\)Raising the wage floor also lowers the wage ceiling, since \( \frac{\partial w}{\partial n_u} \) and \( \frac{\partial w}{\partial k} \) are both positive and the quantities of \( n_u \) and \( k \) are lower in the distorted economy.
Wages in the initial steady state with wage compression are given by

\[ w_{s,t} = \phi w_{u,t} = f_{n_s}(k_t, n_{s,t}, n_{u,t}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (13)

and

\[ w_{u,t} = f_{n_u}(k_t, n_{s,t}, n_{u,t}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (14)

where \( \phi \) is the exogenously determined skill premium, which is greater than 1, but less than the perfect market skill premium, and where \( f_j \) is the derivative of the production function, \( f \), with respect to the \( j \)th factor of production.

Wage compression has traditionally been viewed as a product of the Swedish trade unions' wage policy of solidarity. This policy implies some form of cooperation between workers in different sectors of the economy and between high- and low skilled workers. This cooperation is most often motivated (at least in the public debate) by a desire for some measure of fairness in the distribution of relative wages.

While such a view is entirely compatible with the argument presented here, it is important to note that when markets are competitive wage compression can be introduced without the cooperation of skilled workers and their union. It is only necessary that the union representing unskilled workers has both the means and the desire to raise the low skilled wage above its market clearing level and that the skilled labor market more closely represents a competitive spot market than does the unskilled labor market. Thus, wage compression could also be introduced by a union of low skilled insiders, who care only about their own wage and employment status.

If unions do care about relative wages because their members value fairness, then we must be somewhat cautious when interpreting efficiency losses as welfare losses. The correspondence is no longer one-to-one. That is, we must weigh the utility gains received from increasing fairness against the efficiency losses due to wage compression when judging the effects of wage compression on welfare. On the other hand, if wage compression is merely the result of an insider union which is strong enough to push its
wage demands above the market clearing level, then efficiency losses can be translated directly as welfare losses.

2.2 Equilibrium

An equilibrium for this economy is defined as a sequence of factor prices and allocations such that, given factor prices, the allocations are utility-maximizing, the capital market clears and wages are equal to workers' marginal products.

2.2.1 Steady State

A stationary equilibrium for this economy is given by (i) a constant wage premium \( \phi \), (ii) a series of constant government policies, including tax rates \( \{ \tau_s, \tau_u, \tau_h \} \), replacement ratios, \( b \) and \( d \), government transfers, \( tr \), and government spending on higher education, \( \Phi \), (iii) constant wages and interest rate \( \{ r, w_s, w_u \} \), (iv) a constant population distribution over \( i \in \{ u, s, u_n \} \) and \( j \in \{ 1, 2, ... J \} \) and (v) a constant level of aggregate asset holdings, \( A = \sum_i \sum_j a_{i,j} \), such that the following equilibrium conditions hold:

- Given factor prices, each agent's choice of schooling and assets solves his or her utility maximization problem as described in Equations 1 - 3.
- The government's budget constraint (Equation 8) holds.
- All factors of production are paid according to their marginal products.
- Aggregate savings, \( A \), are equal to the firm's demand for capital, \( k \).
- The number of skilled workers in the economy, \( s \), is given by Equations 4 and 5.
2.2.2 Transition Between Steady States

A similar definition can be used for addressing equilibrium allocations outside of the steady state, for example, during the transition to a new steady state after a policy change, such as a change in the wage premium, $\phi$. When outside of the steady state, we must find a sequence of factor prices, government transfers and individual asset holdings, as well as a sequence describing changes in the population distribution

$\{r_t, w_{s,t}, w_{u,t}, t_{r_t}, a_{i,j,t}, i_{j,t}\}_{t=0}^{N,y;j}$

which, given a set of constants $\{\tau_s, \tau_u, \tau_k, b, d, \Phi, \phi\}$, satisfy the above equilibrium conditions for each period from $t = 0$ to $T$. We assume that we have arrived at the new steady state by time $T$.

2.3 Numerical Solution

The following numerical algorithm can be used to solve for both the transition and the steady state simultaneously. The standard reference for this type of problem is Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).\footnote{See also Rios-Rull (1999).} The following steps are involved:

1. Initialize the population distribution over skills and employment $\{n^0_t\}_{t=1}^T$.

2. Compute an aggregate labor input series for skilled labor $\{n_{s,t}\}_{t=1}^T$ where $n_{s,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{R-1} s_{j,t}$.

3. Compute an aggregate labor series for unskilled workers $\{n_{u,t}\}_{t=1}^T$ where $n_{u,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{R-1} u_{j,t}$.

4. Initialize a series for aggregate capital $\{K^0_t\}_{t=1}^T$.

5. Given $\{K^0_t\}_{t=1}^T$, $\{n_{s,t}\}_{t=1}^T$ and $\{n_{u,t}\}_{t=1}^T$, use the firm’s marginal conditions to obtain a series of factor prices $\{r_t, w_{s,t}, w_{u,t}\}_{t=1}^T$. 

\footnote{See also Rios-Rull (1999).}
6. Given \( \{r_t, w_{s,t}, w_{u,t}\}_{t=1}^T \) solve the asset accumulation problem of each agent, 
given by the following second order difference equation

\[
a_{i,j+2,t} = a_{i,j+1,t} \left[ 1 + r_{t+j} \left( 1 - \tau_k \right) \right] + w_{i,t+j} \left( 1 - \tau_i \right) + tr_{t+j} - \\
\beta \left[ 1 + r_{t+j} \left( 1 - \tau_k \right) \right] \times \\
[ a_{i,j,t} \left[ 1 + r_{t+j-1} \left( 1 - \tau_k \right) \right] + w_{i,t+j-1} \left( 1 - \tau_i \right) - a_{i,j+1,t} + tr_{t+j-1} ]
\]

subject to the boundary constraints for asset holdings

\[
a_{i,1,t}, a_{i,J+1,t} = 0.
\]

This gives us \( \{a_{i,j,t}\}_{t=1}^T, i \in I, j \in J \).

7. Obtain a new series for aggregate capital \( \{K_t^1\}_{t=1}^T \) by aggregating over asset holdings from the previous step.

8. If \( \{K_t^0\}_{t=1}^T \approx \{K_t^1\}_{t=1}^T \), then continue to the next step. If not, update \( \{K_t^0\}_{t=1}^T \) 
and return to step 5.

9. Check that \( \{I_t^0\}_{t=1}^T \) solves Equations 4 and 5 given \( \{r_t, w_{s,t}, w_{u,t}\}_{t=1}^T \). If so, stop. 
If not, update \( \{s_t^0\}_{t=1}^T \subset \{I_t^0\}_{t=1}^T \) and return to step 2.

2.4 Model Calibration

There are fourteen exogenous parameters in this model describing tastes, technologies 
and government policies. Before using the model we must assign values to each of 
these parameters. We must also describe the initial population distribution (in the 
distorted economy). This is done using Swedish data from 1993.

In 1993, 12 percent of the Swedish work force had 3 or more years of higher 
education (SOU, 1995) and the total unemployment rate was 12.8 percent (Lindbeck,
A large portion of this unemployment can be attributed to cyclical factors and to the Swedish economic crisis of the early 1990's. As such, it is not a suitable measure of unemployment in this model, which deals solely with structural, or, equilibrium unemployment. Instead, what we require is an estimate of equilibrium unemployment in Sweden in 1993.

Forslund (1995) estimates that the equilibrium unemployment rate for Sweden in 1993 was between 4.3 and 7.3 percent. The OECD (1999) estimates that the Swedish NAWRU was just under 5 percent (and rising) in 1993. Based on these two sources, the equilibrium unemployment rate in the model with wage compression is set to 5.5 percent. Thus, the initial population distribution in the model with wage compression is

\[ s = 0.12, \quad un = 0.055, \quad u = 1 - s - un = 0.825 \]

and the initial work force in the model with wage compression is calculated as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
    n_{s,1993} &= s \times \left( \frac{(R-1)-3}{J} \right), \\
    students_{1993} &= s \times \left( \frac{\bar{a}}{J} \right), \\
    n_{un,1993} &= un \times \left( \frac{R-1}{J} \right), \\
    n_u,1993 &= \frac{R-1}{J} - n_{s,1993} - students_{1993} - n_{un,1993}.
\end{align*}
\]

The wage premium for skilled workers, \( \phi \), was 1.25 in 1993 (see Table 1). The capital share of income in Sweden, \( \theta_k \), was equal to 0.335 (OECD, 1998). Together with the above information on the distribution of worker types, these parameters allow us to calculate the income share of skilled labor, \( \theta_s \), as follows

\[
\theta_s = \frac{\phi n_s}{\phi n_s + n_u} \times (1 - \theta_k) = 0.1023,
\]

while the income share of unskilled labor is merely the residual \( \theta_u = 1 - \theta_s - \theta_k = \)

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\[^{16}\] 8.2 percent of the work force was openly unemployed and 4.6 percent was engaged in various labor market programs.

\[^{17}\] Although, one could argue that the presence of wage rigidities due to wage compression worsened the economy's ability to react to the large negative shocks of the early 1990's and, as such, worsened the cyclical component of unemployment.
0.5627. The depreciation rate of capital, \( \delta \), is set equal to 0.075 and the subjective discount factor, \( \beta \), is set equal to 0.96.

The replacement ratio for unemployed workers, \( b \), was 80 percent of a low skilled worker's wage in 1993 (Aronsson and Walker, 1997). Students received financial aid in the form of grants and subsidized loans in an amount which was intended to equal 70 percent of a low skilled workers after-tax wage. So, \( d \) is set equal to 0.7 (SFS, 1992).

The proportional tax on capital income, \( \tau_h \), is set equal to 0.3 and the proportional taxes on wage income, \( \tau_s \) and \( \tau_u \), are set to 0.35 and 0.30, respectively. This pair of proportional income tax rates creates a progressive income tax system in which low skilled workers face a marginal income tax rate of 30 percent and high skilled face a marginal tax between 50 and 55 percent.\(^{18}\) These tax rates have been chosen to reflect the actual situation faced by a representative high skilled and low skilled agent in Sweden in 1993.

In 1993 the Swedish government spent 1.584 percent of GDP on higher education (SCB, 1995). At this time, 5.6 percent of the labor force was enrolled in higher education.\(^{19}\) Thus, the cost of having one percent of the work force enrolled in higher education, \( \Phi \), is equal to 0.283 percent of initial GDP.\(^{20}\)

The last two parameters which need calibrating are \( \Omega \) and \( \omega \) associated with the individual cost of schooling function, \( \Omega(\lambda)\). These can be found by calculating the utility cost of schooling for the marginal individual for two different observations of the Swedish economy. The first observation is that of Sweden in 1993. At that time, 12 percent of the work force was skilled. It is assumed that this 12 percent represents the

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\(^{18}\)The exact marginal rate depends upon equilibrium wages, which are not constant during the transition from one steady state to another.

\(^{19}\)The number of students enrolled in Swedish universities and colleges in 1993/94 was 256,442 (SCB, 1996). The size of the labor force was 4,320,000 (SCB, 1995). I use these figures to calculate the number of university students as a percentage of the total available labor force: \( \text{students}/(\text{labor force + students}) = 0.056 \).

\(^{20}\)\( \Phi = 0.01584/0.056 = 0.283 \).
steady state stock of skilled workers given wage and employment differences in 1993. The wage premium for skilled workers in 1993 was equal to 1.25 and the equilibrium unemployment rate was 5.5 percent. Together, these facts make it possible to solve for \( V_{s,1993} \) and \( V_{u,1993} \). The utility cost of schooling for the marginal individual in 1993 is, simply, the difference between the two.

The second observation is that of Sweden in 1986. At that time, 11 percent of the workforce was skilled (SOU, 1995). The wage premium in 1986 was equal to 1.19 (see Table 1) and the equilibrium unemployment rate was 2.7 percent (Forslund, 1995). The income share of capital in 1986 was 0.318 (OECD, 1998). These empirical observations allow us to calculate \( V_{s,1986} \) and \( V_{u,1986} \) and, once again, the utility cost of schooling for the marginal individual in 1986 is simply the difference between these two expected utilities. Equations (5\(_{1993}\)) and (5\(_{1986}\)) are then solved for the two unknowns \( \Omega \) and \( \omega \), which results in \( \Omega = 2553 \) and \( \omega = 19.97 \).

3 Model Simulation

Given the above calibration and, in particular, given an equilibrium unemployment rate for the model with wage compression of 5.5 percent, there is only one wage premium which is consistent with full employment in this model framework. The full

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\(^{21}\) Using observations from the Swedish economy in 1986 and 1993 as approximations of two different steady states is, of course, somewhat problematic. We know that what we are actually observing are different equilibrium outcomes along a path towards some steady state. In particular, this approach is not consistent with actual data on the flow into higher education, since this flow increased by almost 40 percent between these two years (Storesletten and Zilibotti, 1999), while the stock of skilled labor increased by only 9.1 percent. This inconsistency is mainly due to two factors. The first factor is the strong, positive trend in the data on the flows into higher education between 1970 and 1995. This trend is most likely due to an increase in the demand for university graduates and to an increase in the supply of education. Neither of which can be captured by my stationary model.

Secondly, my choice of years for comparison (1986 versus 1993) has been driven by data availability on aggregate wage premia and, unfortunately, the difference in the flow into higher education between these two years is unusually large, because of the large increase in cyclical unemployment among youths which pushed them into higher education. With these qualifications in mind, it is interesting to note that my calibration method is consistent with a detrended time series of the flows into higher education.
employment wage premium is equal to 1.30. Thus, removing wage compression from
the model allows the equilibrium wage premium for skilled workers to rise from 1.25
to 1.30.

This change in the wage premium and subsequent changes in factor prices have
positive effects on all three factors of production. First, the rise in the high skilled
wage raises the percentage of skilled workers in the work force from 12 to 12.28
percent (13.16 percent of the total population, i.e. including students and retired
skilled workers). In fact, there is a small, short-term boom in education since the
wage of skilled workers temporarily overshoots its long-run equilibrium value.

The removal of wage compression also leads to an immediate drop in the wage of
low skilled workers (that is, the removal of wage compression allows for downward
wage flexibility). This lower wage rate (higher wage flexibility) induces firms to hire
low skilled workers. Thus, unemployment among low skilled workers falls from 5.5
percent to zero.

This reduction in unemployment lowers government expenditures on unemploy-
ment insurance. At the same time, the rise in both the number of skilled and unskilled
workers with employment raises tax revenues. An increase in the capital stock also
raises tax revenues. Together, these factors outweigh the modest increase in the cost
of providing education associated with the increase in the number of skilled workers,
so that government transfers increase by 15.61 percent.

The marginal productivity of capital is raised by the increase in the supply of both
types of labor. Aggregate capital, aggregate consumption and output all begin to rise
immediately after the policy change. There are no losers in terms of lost consumption,
despite the lower wage of unskilled workers in both relative and absolute terms. The
efficiency gain (in terms of aggregate consumption) is equal to 4.63 percent.\footnote{The aggregate efficiency gain is calculated as the increase in the discounted stream of aggregate consumption in the new, undistorted economy and reporting it as a percentage of the discounted stream of aggregate consumption in the baseline, distorted economy.}

One question raised by this simulation is why there are so few new skilled workers?
There is only a 2.33 percent increase in the number of skilled workers active in the work force: despite the fact that the wage premium increases by 5 percent. This implies an elasticity between the wage premium and the number of skilled workers of 0.466, which is much lower than the available empirical estimates of 1.796 and 2.273 (Fredriksson, 1997). But, as the discussion in Section 2 illustrated, the wage premium is not, in fact, the most interesting or relevant object to examine when explaining an individuals' choice of schooling (and, hence, the number of skilled workers in the economy). Instead, given $\Lambda(\lambda)$, we should be looking at changes in the expected lifetime utility of a worker, i.e. at changes in $V_s$ and $V_u$. The elasticity between $V_s$ and the number of skilled workers is 2.51 and the elasticity between $V_u$ and the number of skilled workers is -1.72. These elasticities are quite close (in absolute value) to those reported by Fredriksson (1997).

The simulation shows us that when wage inequality increases, so does employment among low skilled workers and, hence, the probability of becoming employed faced by a low skilled worker. An increase in this probability affects the value of $V_u$ positively. This raises the opportunity cost (in terms of foregone wages) of going to school and weakens incentives to obtain schooling. A lower wage, of course, has the opposite affect on $V_u$. In this simulation, the change in the difference between the expected lifetime utilities, $\Delta (V_s - V_u)$, is not large enough to have a great impact on the percentage of skilled workers in the work force.

There are also two exogenous factors which lessen the impact of wage compression on individuals' choice of schooling; the progressive income tax system and generous financial aid. In fact, the progressive tax system appears to have a larger (negative) impact than wage compression on the supply of skilled labor. This can be shown by running an alternative simulation experiment in which both wage compression and the progressive tax system are removed. This is done by simply setting $\tau_u = \tau_s = 0.3$.

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23This mechanism is quite similar to those discussed in Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Agell and Lommerud (1997).
In this case, the number of skilled workers rises to 12.68 percent of the work force (13.58 percent of the total population). The net increase in the supply of skilled labor due to the elimination of progressive taxes is 0.40 percent of the work force, while the net increase in the supply of skilled labor due to the removal of wage compression is 0.28 percent of the work force.

3.1 Sensitivity Analysis

Since the amount of wage compression present in the Swedish economy is inherently unobservable, it was necessary to make an assumption about the level of equilibrium unemployment in the Swedish economy in order to close the model. In the preferred calibration used above, equilibrium unemployment due to wage compression was set at 5.5 percent. To examine the effects of alternative assumptions regarding the level of equilibrium unemployment in the economy, the above simulation exercise was repeated for different values of equilibrium unemployment between 1 and 10 percent.

The result of this exercise can be seen in Figure 1. The figure can be interpreted in two different ways. The first, is to simply view this figure as a menu from which we can read off the impact that different levels of wage compression have on unemployment and on individuals’ choice of schooling. The second, is to use Figure 1 as an aid in determining whether or not the relationships between wage compression and unemployment and between wage compression and choice of schooling are linear.

In the left-hand panel of the figure, we see that the relationship between wage compression and unemployment is approximately linear. Thus, as wage compression increases (decreases), unemployment increases (decreases) by roughly the same amount. In the right-hand panel of the figure, we see that the relationship between wage compression and the loss of skills in the workforce is somewhat convex. This is because agents are weakly risk averse and because agents’ taste and aptitude for schooling is normally distributed over the population.

The next question to ask is whether or not the low number of new skilled workers
in the perfect market equilibrium is the product of an overly restrictive, utility cost function? This could be due either to the choice of parameters, $\Omega$ and $\omega$, or to the choice of cumulative distribution function, $\Lambda(\lambda)$. To test these possibilities, let's first assume that $\lambda$ is uniformly distributed across individuals along the interval 0 to 1. Using this distribution and recalculating $\Omega$ and $\omega$, so that all of the equilibrium conditions are met, we find that the results of the simulation do not change.

Next, we return to using the standard normal distribution for $\Lambda(\lambda)$, but allow the cost function parameters, $\Omega$ and $\omega$, to change. First, let us hold $\Omega$ constant and change the value of $\omega$. Making $\omega$ smaller lowers the number of skilled workers in the perfect market equilibrium, $12 \leq n_s(\omega: \omega) \leq 12.28$. Raising $\omega$ increases the number of skilled workers in the economy, $12.28 \leq n_s(\omega: \overline{\omega}) \leq 12.70$. The values of $\omega$ and $\overline{\omega}$ are the lowest and the highest values, respectively, for which all of the equilibrium conditions hold under the assumption that the initial steady state of the economy is marked by wage compression. Thus, removing wage compression and simultaneously allowing $\omega$ to move, produces at most 12.70 percent skilled workers. The results are identical if we, instead, allow for changes in $\Omega$, while holding $\omega$ constant.

Together, these exercises demonstrate that the number of skilled workers in the
perfect market equilibrium is not overly sensitive to the distribution of \( \lambda \) nor to the calibration of \( \Omega \) and \( \omega \). The utility cost function is not overly restrictive. It is the model itself which produces an endogenous restriction upon the number of skilled workers in the steady state without wage compression. It is the high rate of unemployment caused by wage compression which dampens the negative effect that wage compression has on the choice of schooling.

The choice of production function, on the other hand, is not without consequence for the quantitative welfare experiments carried out in this paper. In the model, firms are assumed to have access to a Cobb-Douglas (C-D) production technology. A more general, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, however, could either mitigate or worsen the welfare losses which arise when wages are compressed, since the employment effects of wage compression depend, in part, upon the elasticities of substitution between different factors of production.

Repeating the above experiment using a CES production function and setting the elasticity of substitution between high- and low skilled workers equal to 2, we find that the negative employment effects of wage compression are stronger in the CES case than in the C-D case. In the CES case, unions need only compress wages by 3 percent in order to produce 5.5 percent unemployment.\(^{24}\) Given that empirical estimates of the elasticities of substitution between high- and low skilled workers and between capital and low skilled workers are almost unanimously greater than one,\(^{25}\) the C-D case appears to be a somewhat conservative estimate of the quantitative impact of wage compression on welfare.

\(^{24}\)The details of this experiment can be found in an earlier, working paper version of this study (Lindquist, 2000).

\(^{25}\)See Hamermesh (1993) for a review of the empirical estimates.
4 The Welfare Effects of Wage Compression

Changes in welfare due to the removal of wage compression are examined from the perspective of each individual agent. This is done using a simple measure of compensating variation. This measure is calculated by solving either Equation 17 or 18 for the constant consumption transfer (or tax), $\gamma_{i,\tilde{t}}$, needed in each period of an agent's life after the policy change, so that a type $i$ agent born in period $t$ is as well off (or as poor off) in the initial economy with wage compression as he or she would be in the economy without wage compression. For those agents born at or before the time of the policy change, where $t = 0$ is the date of the policy change, we solve

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\tilde{t}+J-1} U_{i,\tilde{t},t} \left(c_{i,\tilde{t},t} + \gamma_{i,\tilde{t}}\right) \beta^{t-1} = \sum_{t=1}^{\tilde{t}+J-1} U_{i,\tilde{t},t} \left(c^*_{i,\tilde{t},t}\right) \beta^{t-1}. \quad (17)$$

For those born after the policy change, we solve

$$\sum_{t=\tilde{t}}^{\tilde{t}+J-1} U_{i,\tilde{t},t} \left(c_{i,\tilde{t},t} + \gamma_{i,\tilde{t}}\right) \beta^{t-\tilde{t}} = \sum_{t=\tilde{t}}^{\tilde{t}+J-1} U_{i,\tilde{t},t} \left(c^*_{i,\tilde{t},t}\right) \beta^{t-\tilde{t}}. \quad (18)$$

The present value of this stream of constant consumption transfers (or taxes) received by the individual agent is then reported as a percentage of the present value of that individual's total future consumption stream using their consumption path in the distorted economy as the baseline for comparison.

Individual welfare gains are shown in Figure 2. The big winners are those workers who were initially unemployed, but are able to find work once wage compression is removed, $un : u$. Workers from this group who are born into the new steady state have a 21.07 percent gain in welfare.\footnote{Of course, these workers are never actually unemployed. They represent the group of workers that would have been unemployed in the old steady state with wage compression.} Skilled workers also enjoy significant welfare gains. Skilled workers, $s$, born into the new steady state, enjoy a welfare gain of 6.19 percent. Even unskilled workers who had jobs before the policy change enjoy
significant welfare gains. Disregarding those agents born at $t \in \{-60, -59\}$, the welfare gains of employed, low skilled workers, $u$, are between 2.08 and 4.81 percent, depending on the age of the individual at the time of the policy change. The welfare gain of low skilled workers born into the new steady state is equal to 3.67 percent.

The large welfare gains made by employed, unskilled workers deserve some closer attention, since they call into question the rationality of wage compression in this model. If we first take the perspective of a perfectly rational, benevolent union which values fairness, these large welfare losses could be interpreted as their willingness to pay for an egalitarian wage policy. A second possibility is that this benevolent union is behaving myopically, since it has been given only one goal to pursue: that of implementing an egalitarian wage policy. If we take the perspective of a strong, insider union which does not value fairness, then these welfare losses can only be regarded as the product of some (as yet) unexplained source of myopic behavior.

Examining the source of these welfare gains more closely opens the avenue to an interesting line of interpretation, which applies equally to both types of unions. The increase in consumption enjoyed by the newly employed, low skilled workers is, in
part, due to the fact that their new wage is higher than their old unemployment benefits and, in part, due to an increase in the transfers they receive from the government. Skilled workers also enjoy a higher wage, but the majority of their increase in consumption comes from higher government transfers. The welfare gain of unskilled workers who were initially employed is entirely due to increased government transfers.

In the model simulation, the government’s budget surplus in the new equilibrium is 15.61 percent larger than in the distorted equilibrium. This surplus is returned to each individual in a lump sum manner and it is this surplus which is mainly responsible for the large gains in individual consumption and welfare. There is no question that such a large increase in the government’s surplus could be used to raise welfare, by raising the quantity and quality of government services, by increasing transfers or by lowering taxes. Both types of unions, however, will behave myopically if there maximands include only arguments such as wages, employment and relative wages and not arguments such as individual consumption which is a function of (among other things) government transfers. Furthermore, if government services are less than perfectly productive, or if the unemployment insurance system is perceived as inefficient, then the above welfare gains may not be realized in full.

For example, it has been argued that the Swedish unemployment insurance is inefficient (Calmfors, 1993). It allows certain groups of workers to maintain high wages despite high levels of unemployment among their fellow union members, while only paying a fraction of the cost of higher unemployment benefits themselves. In effect, they are able to pass on the cost of higher unemployment benefits to workers in other sectors. As such, they do not benefit directly from lower unemployment costs, since they are not the ones paying these costs in the first place. Due to the large size of the low skilled cohort, this particular type of negative externality is quite small in the model. All workers do, in fact, receive increased transfers from the government when unemployment goes down.

To illustrate the importance of government transfers in the model, and to demon-
Figure 3: The Welfare Gain from Removing Wage Compression (in an Economy Without Transfers) of a Type $i$ Agent Born at Time $t$, Where $t = 0$ Is the Year of the Policy Change.

To demonstrate how these transfers may affect the union’s incentives to compress wages, let us examine an example with non-productive government services, where the budget surplus is simply thrown into the sea. This can be implemented by setting transfers in the individual’s budget constraint to zero. Individual welfare gains in this experiment are shown in Figure 3.

The rationale of the myopic, benevolent union and the strong, insider union for implementing wage compression is now more clear. A majority of workers are, in fact, better off in the distorted model. In the new steady state, the formerly unemployed workers, $un : u$, have a welfare gain of 23.58 percent, skilled workers have a welfare gain of 2.81 percent and unskilled workers experience a welfare loss of -0.79 percent. Thus, the extent to which the welfare gains of removing wage compression are realized depends, to a large degree, on how effectively increases in the government’s budget

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27The reason why old, low skilled workers gain from removing wage compression is that they lose only a few years of artificially high wages, while their savings (pensions) become more valuable due to a higher interest rate during the transition. In the new steady state, all employed low skilled workers are losers.
surplus are translated into consumption (and utility) through increases in the quantity and quality of government services, increased transfers or through lowering taxes.

5 Nash Bargaining

In the model above, the labor market for skilled workers was perfectly competitive, while the market for low skilled workers was characterized as a right-to-manage contract. First, the union and firm negotiated over low skilled wages. During these negotiations the union was able to raise the low skilled wage, \( w_m \), far enough above the perfect market wage, \( w_m^* \), so as to implement its wage policy, \( 1 < \phi < w_m^*/w_m^* \).

Then, after the low skilled wage was determined, the firm decided on employment by hiring skilled- and unskilled workers up to the point where their wages were equal to their marginal products, i.e. employment was determined by the firm’s two labor demand (marginal product) curves. The wage-employment outcome (for low skilled workers) of this right-to-manage contract is point A in Figure 4.

It is a well known result that right-to-manage contracts are inefficient (Leontief, 1946; Blanchard and Fischer, 1993). Examining the union’s indifference curves and the firm’s isoprofit curves in Figure 4, we see that there are a number of points to the South-East of point A (labeled CC) which are preferred by both the union and the firm. The contract curve in Figure 4 shows all of the points where the firm’s isoprofit curve and the union’s indifference curve are tangent to one another. Tangency implies an efficient solution to the wage and employment bargaining process. Exactly where on the contract curve the union and firm find themselves after negotiations depends on their relative bargaining strengths.

Since right-to-manage contracts are inefficient, they may not be good descriptions of the actual wage bargaining process which takes place between unions and firms. It may be that unions and firms bargain (explicitly) over wages and (implicitly) over employment so as to achieve more efficient contracts. If so, this gives the union
Figure 4: Employment and Wages in Efficient and Inefficient Contracts

an important channel through which it can mitigate the negative employment (and, hence, welfare) effects of its egalitarian wage policy. This point will be demonstrated here by formalizing an efficient contract as the solution to a Nash bargaining game. The first step in doing this is to specify the union’s and the firm’s objective functions more carefully.

Assume that union membership is universal and that the union has two objectives. Its first objective is to implement its relative wage policy, $\phi$. Then, given $\phi$, the union strives to maximize the aggregate utility of its members. These goals are achieved through negotiations with the firm over wage and employment levels. The union’s objective function, $\hat{U}$, can be written as

$$\hat{U} = n_s U(w_s) + n_u U(w_u) + unU(B)$$

subject to the relative wage constraint

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28 Nickell and Layard (1999) present a similar argument.
\[ w_s = \phi w_u \]  \hspace{1cm} (20)

where \( B \) represents unemployment benefits which are determined exogenously by the government.

The firm operates in a competitive goods market. It's objective function, \( \hat{\Pi} \), is given by

\[ \hat{\Pi} = f(k, n_s, n_u) - n_s w_s - n_u w_u - \delta k. \]  \hspace{1cm} (21)

Thus, \( \hat{\Pi} \), is equal to the net returns on invested capital.

If the firm and the union can't agree on a contract (i.e. if negotiations fail and there is a strike and/or lockout) the firm receives zero profits. Union members, on the other hand, receive a payment \( B \). The threat points of the two parties are, thus, zero and \( U(B) \), respectively.

Given the long run supply curve for skilled labor, an efficient contract is the solution to the following Nash bargaining game

\[
\max_{w_u, w_s, n_u, n_s} \mathcal{N} = \left\{ n_u \left[ U(w_u) - U(B) \right] + n_s \left[ U(w_s) - U(B) \right] \right\}^\alpha \hat{\Pi}^{(1-\alpha)} \hspace{1cm} (22)
\]

subject to Equations 20 and 21. Superscript \( \alpha \in (0,1) \) represents the bargaining strength of the union. Substituting Equations 20 and 21 into Equation 22 results in

\[
\max_{w_u, w_s} \mathcal{N} = \left\{ n_u \left[ U(w_u) - U(B) \right] + n_s \left[ U(\phi w_u) - U(B) \right] \right\}^\alpha \times \left[ f(k, n_s, n_u) - n_s \phi w_u - n_u w_u - \delta k \right]^{(1-\alpha)}. \hspace{1cm} (23)
\]

The first order conditions are

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{N}}{\partial n_u} : \alpha \Psi \hat{\Pi} + (1 - \alpha) \Upsilon f'(n_u) - (1 - \alpha) \Upsilon w_u = 0 \hspace{1cm} (24)
\]
and
\[
\frac{\partial N}{\partial w_u} : \alpha n_u U'(w_u) \tilde{\Pi} + \alpha n_s U' (\phi w_u) \tilde{\Pi} - (1 - \alpha) (\phi n_s + n_u) \Upsilon = 0 \quad (25)
\]
where
\[
\tilde{\Pi} \equiv f (k, n_s, n_u) - n_s \phi w_u - n_u w_u - \delta k
\]
\[
\Upsilon \equiv n_u [U (w_u) - U (B)] + n_s [U (\phi w_u) - U (B)]
\]
\[
\Psi \equiv U (w_u) - U (B) .
\]

The appropriate rent sharing condition is obtained by rearranging Equation 24. It is a somewhat complicated function of both the average and marginal products of unskilled labor.\(^{29}\)

\[
w_u = \left[ \frac{\alpha \Psi n_u}{\alpha \Psi (\phi n_s + n_u) - (1 - \alpha) \Upsilon} \right] f (k, n_s, n_u) - \delta k
\]
\[
+ \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) \Upsilon}{\alpha \Psi (\phi n_s + n_u) - (1 - \alpha) \Upsilon} \right] f' (n_u) .
\]

Combining Equations 24 and 25 gives us

\[
w_u - f' (n_u) = \frac{(\phi n_s + n_u) [U (w_u) - U (B)]}{n_u U'(w_u) + n_s U' (\phi w_u)}
\]

which guarantees that the solution \(\{w_u, n_u\}\) lies on the contract curve.

For a given \(n_u\), Equation 27 can be used to calculate the wage in an efficient contract. Assuming that \(U (\cdot)\) is a log utility function and that \(B = bw_u\), where \(b \in (0, 1)\), the low skilled wage is given by

\[
w_u = \frac{f' (n_u)}{1 - \left( \frac{n_u}{n_s + n_u} \right) \log \left( \frac{1}{b} \right)}. \quad (28)
\]

The high skilled wage is given by Equation 20 and the per unit, net rate of return on

\(^{29}\) Note that setting \(a = 0\) gives \(w_u = f' (n_u)\).
capital is simply the residual

\[ r = \frac{f(k, n_s, n_u) - n_s w_s - n_u w_u - \delta k}{k}. \]  

(29)

Furthermore, with \( \{w_s, w_u, n_s, n_u\} \) in hand, one can solve for the union's bargaining strength by simply rearranging Equation 25

\[ \alpha = \frac{\gamma w_u}{\gamma w_u + \left( \frac{n_s + n_u}{\phi n_s + n_u} \right) \Pi}. \]  

(30)

Knowing the value of \( \alpha \) makes it possible to pin down a unique equilibrium for the unobserved model without wage compression. The agent's maximization problem, schooling decision and the description of the government sector are the same as in the previous model.

5.1 Equilibrium

An equilibrium for this economy is defined as a sequence of factor prices and allocations such that, given factor prices, the allocations are utility-maximizing, the capital market clears, and wage and employment contracts are efficient (i.e. they are the solution to the above Nash bargaining game).

5.1.1 Steady State

A stationary equilibrium for this economy is given by (i) constant bargaining strengths for the union, \( \alpha \), and the firm, \( (1 - \alpha) \), (ii) constant threat points equal to \( U(B) \) and zero, for the union and the firm respectively, (iii) a constant wage premium \( \phi \), (iv) a series of constant government policies, including; tax rates \( \{\tau_s, \tau_u, \tau_k\} \), unemployment benefits, \( B \), student aid, \( d \), government spending on higher education, \( \Phi \), and government transfers, \( tr \), (v) constant wages and interest rate \( \{r, w_s, w_u\} \), (vi) a constant population distribution over \( i \in \{u, s, un\} \) and (vii) a constant level of aggregate...
asset holdings, \( A = \sum_i \sum_j a_{i,j} \), such that the following equilibrium conditions hold:

- Given factor prices, each agent's choice of schooling and assets solves his or her utility maximization problem, given Equations 1 - 3.

- The government's budget constraint (Equation 8) holds.

- Wage and employment contracts are the solution to the above Nash bargaining game.

- Aggregate savings, \( A \), are equal to firms' demand for capital, \( k \).

- the number of skilled workers in the economy, \( s \), is given by Equations 4 and 5.

### 5.1.2 Transition Between Steady States

To solve for the transition between steady states we must find a sequence of factor prices, government transfers, replacement ratios and individual asset holdings, \( \{ r_t, w_{s,t}, w_{u,t}, b_t, tr_t, a_{i,j,t} \}_{t=0}^T \), as well as a sequence describing changes in the population distribution, \( \{ u_t, s_t, un_t \}_{t=0}^T \), which, given a set of constants \( \{ \tau_s, \tau_u, \tau_k, B, d, \Phi, \phi \} \), satisfy the above equilibrium conditions for each period from \( t = 0 \) to \( T \). As before, we assume that we have arrived at the new steady state by time \( T \).

### 5.2 Numerical Solution

The following numerical algorithm can be used to solve for both the transition and the new steady state (without wage compression) simultaneously. The original algorithm (see Section 2.3) has been modified in two ways. Step 5a has been added so that the government can keep unemployment benefits, \( B \), constant throughout this experiment by varying the replacement ratio, \( b \). Step 5b is needed to insure a correct and constant union bargaining strength, \( \alpha \). It also pins down the unemployment rate in the Nash bargaining model without wage compression. This step is needed since wages no
longer reflect marginal productivities as they did in the first model. The original solution algorithm is modified in the following manner:

5a Calculate \( b_t = \frac{B}{w_{v_t}} \).

5b Calculate the union’s bargaining strength \( \tilde{\alpha} \). If \( \tilde{\alpha} = \alpha \), then continue to the next step. If not, update \( \{u^0_t\}^T_{t=1} \subset \{f^0_t\}^T_{t=1} \) and return to step 2.

5.3 Model Calibration

Wherever possible, the Nash bargaining model is calibrated in the same way as the previous model with competitive markets. This is done in order to make the two welfare experiments as comparable as possible. The results should then be model specific, not parameter specific. The following parameters are identical in the two models: the depreciation rate, \( \delta \); the subjective discount rate, \( \beta \); the tax rates, \( \tau_s, \tau_u \) and \( \tau_k \); government spending on higher education, \( \Phi \); financial aid \( d \); as well as both the distorted wage premium, \( \phi \), and the true wage premium, \( \phi' \).

The values of \( \Omega \) and \( \omega \) are somewhat different in every experiment in this paper, but they are always calculated in the same way using observed values from the Swedish economy in 1986 and 1993. The replacement ratio, \( b_t \), is initially the same, but during the transition and in the new steady state, it must be allowed to change slightly in order to keep \( B \) constant. This is taken care of automatically in step 5a of the algorithm above.

Once again, it is assumed that the production technology is Cobb-Douglas. In the absence of competitive labor markets, however, income shares are no longer directly related to factor productivities. As such, there is an insufficient number of observables to calculate the productivity parameters \( \{\theta_k, \theta_s, \theta_u\} \) in the same manner as before. This forces us to make an assumption on what the true value of relative productivities between skilled and unskilled workers is before we can proceed with calibrating and solving the model. In order to make this experiment comparable to the previous
one, it is assumed that $\phi^* = 1.30$. Given this assumption, we then find the $\theta_k$ which produces the observed income share of capital in 1993 which was 0.335. This results in $\theta_k = 0.3978$, which is, of course, higher than the observed income share of capital, since $\alpha > 0$. The productivity parameter $\theta_s$ is equal to

$$\theta_s = \frac{n_s \phi^* - \theta_k n_s \phi^*}{(n_u + n_s \phi^*)} = 0.0966$$

and $\theta_u$ is equal to $1 - \theta_s - \theta_k = 0.5056$.

### 5.4 Model Simulation

Imagine now that the union wants to implement a more egalitarian wage policy. Assume that it wants to lower the wage premium from 1.30 to 1.25, just as it did in the original experiment in Section 3. How would such a policy affect the wage and employment outcome in this Nash bargaining model? Are the effects of wage compression the same as those in the previous model with competitive markets?

The solution to the Nash bargaining game without wage compression is depicted in the upper half of Figure 5. The lower half of Figure 5 shows the solution to the game after the union has lowered the wage premium. The lower half of the Figure and all variables denoted with primes, $'$, represent the equilibrium of the Nash bargaining model calibrated for Sweden in 1993.\(^{30}\)

In Figure 5, we see that the introduction of wage compression lowers the high skilled wage from $w_s$ to $w'_s$. This leads to a decrease in the number of skilled workers in the economy from $s$ to $s'$. In the model simulation, the number of skilled workers goes down from 12.28 to 12 percent of the labor force. Thus, the introduction of wage compression lowers the number of skilled workers in the economy by the same amount as in the model with competitive markets.

\(^{30}\)Throughout this experiment, both skilled and unskilled workers are being paid a wage which exceeds their marginal product, while capital is being paid less than its marginal product.
Figure 5: Wage Compression in the Nash Bargaining Model

Fewer skilled workers automatically increases the number of unskilled agents in the economy, \((1 - s') = (u' + un') > (u + un) = (1 - s)\). It also leads to a downward shift in the firm’s demand for low skilled workers.\(^{31}\) These two shifts are depicted in the lower right diagram of Figure 5. Together, they increase the number of unemployed low skilled workers, i.e. \(un' > un\). In the model simulation, lowering the wage premium from 1.30 to 1.25 increases unemployment by 1.2 percent (as compared to a 5.5 percent increase in the competitive markets model). Thus, the negative employment effects of wage compression are significantly lower in the Nash bargaining model than in the competitive markets model.

Removing wage compression from the Nash bargaining model increases aggregate efficiency by 0.60 percent. In the model with competitive markets the efficiency increase was equal to 4.63 percent of aggregate consumption. So we see that the efficiency loss in the Nash bargaining model due to wage compression is smaller by a

\(^{31}\)Since \(\partial f_{n_u}(n_s, n_u, k) / \partial n_s > 0\).
Figure 6: The Welfare Gain from Removing Wage Compression (in the Nash Bargaining Model) of a Type $i$ Agent Born at Time $t$, Where $t = 0$ Is the Year of the Policy Change.

The union's bargaining strength, $\alpha$, is assumed to be a constant ($\alpha_{1993} = 0.334$). The employment effects of wage compression in this Nash bargaining model are, however, quite sensitive to changes in the union's bargaining strength. A one percent increase in the bargaining strength of the union eliminates nearly all of the negative employment effects of wage compression, while weakening the union by the same amount makes the employment effects almost as large as those in the competitive markets case. While it is important for the reader to be aware of these sensitivity results, the assumption of constant bargaining power maintains the consistency of this experiment with the previous experiments.

### 5.5 The Welfare Effects of Wage Compression

The individual welfare gains from removing wage compression in the Nash bargaining model are shown in Figure 6. Once again, we see that the big winners are those workers who were initially unemployed, but are able to find work once wage compression is
removed, \( un : u \). Workers from this group who are born into the new steady state have a 17.78 percent gain in welfare. Skilled workers, \( s \), also enjoy significant welfare gains. Skilled workers born into the new steady state, enjoy a welfare gain of 2.63 percent. The majority of low skilled workers are, however, slightly worse off in the economy without wage compression. The welfare loss of employed, low skilled workers, \( u \), born into the new steady state is \(-0.15\) percent. The welfare gains from removing wage compression are lower in the Nash bargaining model, since the negative employment effect of wage compression is lower than in the model with competitive markets.

6 Conclusion

The university wage premium in Sweden fell dramatically during the 1970's and early 1980's. It has increased somewhat in recent years, but it is still low in comparison to the university wage premium found in the United States and compared to its own historical levels. In a recent review of the literature, Arai and Kjellström (1999) conclude that the returns to higher education in Sweden are, in fact, quite low by international standards.

Most authors have attributed this precipitous drop in the university wage premium to an increase in the supply of college graduates and to the egalitarian wage policies of the Swedish trade unions. The main presumption in this paper has been that the Swedish trade unions have, in fact, been successful in promoting wage equality across workers with different levels of education and, hence, different marginal products. The purpose of this paper has been to quantify the welfare effects associated with this distortionary wage policy.

In particular, this paper has focused upon the welfare effects of distortions to the supply of skilled labor and to employment opportunities for low skilled workers. These effects have been studied in two different model environments; one with competitive markets and one with Nash bargaining. The introduction of wage compression has the
same qualitative effect in both models. Wage compression lowers the number of skilled workers and raises unemployment. The quantitative effects of wage compression are also the same in terms of their negative impact on the supply of skilled labor. This effect was found to be rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.

The quantitative results of these two models are quite different, however, with respect to the negative impact that wage compression has upon employment among low skilled workers. When markets are competitive, even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low skilled workers. The size of the welfare loss, however, is lower in the Nash bargaining model by a factor of 8, since bargaining over both wages and employment produces an efficient labor contract which mitigates the negative employment effects of wage compression.

These results may be of interest to policy makers in countries which have labor markets characterized by high levels of unionization and active wage policies. They imply that more attention must be paid to the negative employment effects of distortionary wage policies than to the impact of wage compression upon individuals’ choice of schooling. It is also important that policy makers attempt to understand the trade unions’ rationale for implementing such a distortionary wage policy if they are interested in affecting change. Making unemployment insurance programs more efficient, for example, reduces the incentive to compress wages. Lastly, we should keep in mind that the welfare burden imposed by wage compression is not evenly distributed among workers. While skilled workers do suffer a significant welfare loss, it is the low skilled unemployed who bear the largest burden.
References


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[34] OECD (1998), Economic Outlook.


